Sudden strike the last stand: Sudden Strike 3 on GOG.com

Sudden Strike 3 — The Last Stand Cheats PC & Trainer ᐅ 6 Cheat Codes

Sudden Strike 3 — The Last Stand Cheats PC & Trainer ᐅ 6 Cheat Codes | PLITCH





  • EN



  • DE



  • PL



  • FR



  • ES



  • TR



  • PT





  • Home

  • >

  • Games

  • >

  • Sudden Strike 3 — The Last Stand


by

Free Cheats







Activate First


Prepare for cheats


Faction = Allies/USSR


Faction = german

Health/Energy


Infinite fuel

Premium Cheats





Weapons


Infinite ammo

Health/Energy


Godmode


Download Free


Trustpilot


Learn more about PLITCH


PLITCH is an independent PC software with 50300+ cheats for 3700+ PC games, including 6 cheats for Sudden Strike 3 — The Last Stand

About: Sudden Strike 3 — The Last Stand


Get PLITCH Premium — play by your own rules


PLITCH is a Freemium Software covering 3,700+ PC games. Every game has a limited set of free cheats that you can use as you wish.


However, to gain full and unlimited access to our entire database of 50,300+ cheats you need to upgrade to PLITCH PREMIUM.



Show all premium options

PLITCH COMPANION APPS


Feel the power of PLITCH with the PLITCH Link apps …



… and the PLITCH Overlay in your PC game.


* To use the apps and the Overlay in your Single Player PC games,
you have to intall the PLITCH client and create an account.

Sudden Strike 3 — The Last Stand Community Board






This website uses cookies to make your visit as userfriendly as possible. For further information please visit our privacy policy statements.



Accept All

Manage Preferences

Cookie Settings

General information

You control your data

What are cookies and why are they used?

How can I change my settings?


Technically necessary cookies

These cookies are mandatory and are used to activate our website’s core functionalities and all related services. Without these cookies, our website would not function, thus they cannot be disabled.


Cookies that help us gather anonymized statistics

These cookies allow us to measure the general performance of our website; data collected here is always anonymized. Things we measure here are page load times, our bounce rate, which of our game sites are selected most often or which countries our users visit us from. This in turn is very important to properly load balance our servers, for example.


Cookies that help us direct marketing services more accurately

These cookies help us identify via which channels, influencers or media sites users come to our website. This helps us to better plan advertising and special offer campaigns – and also avoid posting unnecessary advertisements.

Save



Accept All








Sudden Strike: The Last Stand for PC Reviews

PC

  • Publisher:

    Fireglow

  • Release Date:
    Canceled

  • Summary

  • Critic Reviews

  • User Reviews

  • Details & Credits

  • Trailers & Videos

Metascore

  1. First Review
  2. Second Review
  3. Third Review
  4. Fourth Review

No score yet

—
based on

0 Critic Reviews

Awaiting 4 more reviews
What’s this?

  • Summary:

    Sudden Strike: The Last Stand is the sequel to Sudden Strike 3: Arms for Victory and features an improved user interface and graphics.

  • Developer:

    Fireglow

  • Genre(s): Strategy, Real-Time, Historic, General
  • Cheats:
    On GameFAQs
  • More Details and Credits »

Score distribution:

  1. Positive:

    0
    out of

  2. Mixed:

    0
    out of

  3. Negative:

    0
    out of

Essential Links

Full List »

  • By Metascore
  • By user score

95

Persona 5 Royal

90

The Legend of Heroes: Trails from Zero

90

Neon White

89

I Was a Teenage Exocolonist

89

Cuphead in the Delicious Last Course

89

HYPER DEMON

88

Uncharted: Legacy of Thieves Collection

88

Immortality

88

Pentiment

88

AI: The Somnium Files — nirvanA Initiative

88

Marvel’s Spider-Man: Miles Morales

87

Marvel’s Spider-Man Remastered

86

Return to Monkey Island

79

Temtem

79

Ghost Song

77

Honey, I Joined a Cult

76

Mount & Blade II: Bannerlord

71

Session. Skate Sim

70

Scorn

65

The Guild 3

All Current Games »

Dictation of Victory — «PROVIDE YOURSELF FROM A SUDDEN IMPACT OF THE ENEMY». PREPARATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RKKA FOR WAR

07/27/2022 article

«PROVIDE YOURSELF FROM A SUDDEN IMPACT OF THE ENEMY». PREPARATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RKKA FOR WAR

In the autumn of 1939, the General Staff of the Red Army firmly decided on the future enemy in the West. It will be Germany with its possible allies. Until June 1941, all military plans were permeated by the main idea: how to most effectively counteract possible aggression .

PREPARATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RKKA FOR THE WAR WITH THE NAZIS

Major transformations took place in the Red Army, especially after the war with Finland. The Mobilization Directorate, together with other divisions of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff, came to the conclusion that in a future war it is necessary to keep about 9-10 million people under arms. It was believed that this is quite an uplifting figure, which the country’s economy and population are able to provide. At 19In 1940, a new MP-40 mobilization plan was adopted. According to it, a complete inventory of the military economy, relations with local authorities in the event of war was carried out, lists of those liable for military service were compiled, the work of military registration and enlistment offices was checked, etc.

The work was so extensive that the military districts reported on it only in January 1941. However, after that, simultaneously with the change of leadership in the General Staff, a new mobilization plan is adopted — MP-41. Its preparation and implementation required even greater costs.

Page of the updated strategic deployment plan dated March 11, 1941. CA MO RF

The complete provision of the Red Army with weapons and equipment according to the MP-41 plan could be satisfied only after five years. Almost all counties asked for a delay, but they were denied. Therefore, the plan was never fully implemented. By June 22, 1941, out of 198 rifle divisions, half had 10.3 thousand people each (with a staff strength of 12 thousand), 78 (about 40%) had 5.9thousand people. The formation of the remaining 23 divisions was just beginning. In 92 tank and motorized divisions, out of the 31.2 thousand tanks laid down by the states, 18. 7 thousand were serviceable, that is, 60%. Of the 44 fortified areas, only 17 had personnel for subsequent deployment. 106 aviation regiments out of 348, or more than 30%, were in the formation stage.

The objective problem was that many reforms were carried out simultaneously, swiftly, without sufficient elaboration of details, which inevitably led to large disproportions, delays in terms and imbalance in the management mechanism.

Photo: Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, General of the Army Georgy Zhukov and General of the Army Kirill Meretskov (center, left to right) at an exercise in the 99th Rifle Division of the Kyiv Special Military District near Lvov. 1940 Source: waralbum.ru

In the spring of 1941, with the increasing concentration of German troops on the Soviet borders, the General Staff began to concretize counteraction plans. In general, they proceeded from the already established views that with the outbreak of the war (no one knew how it would begin) there would be some time period for the deployment of troops, which would then begin pitched battles. The enemy (Germany), despite the possible advantage in the directions of strikes, will also have to spend some time to deploy.

The direction of the main attack of the Wehrmacht and the general plan of the operation «Barbarossa» were not clear to the leadership of the USSR. Therefore proceeded from the general strategic considerations. Since the Nazis at various levels repeatedly declared the importance of capturing Ukraine, it was not difficult to assume that, perhaps, the southwestern territories would become the main theater of military operations. So they came up with the idea, embodied in the most detailed form in the draft version of the «Refined Plan for the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and in the East,» Germany from the Balkan countries, deprive it of its most important economic bases and decisively influence the Balkan countries in matters of their participation in the war against us. Compilers of very valuable documentary collections “1941 years” refrained from publishing the entire text, reprinting only 16 sheets. They omitted the most important, fifth, part from sheets 17 to 55 inclusive, which is called «The Foundations of Our Strategic Deployment in the West.»

Photo: Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky and a subordinate in Port Arthur. Source: waralbum.ru

This is an important document requiring special consideration. The handwritten text was written in ink by Alexander Vasilevsky, Deputy Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff. He also put down the date — March 11, 1941 years old. The names of People’s Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko and the new Chief of the General Staff Georgy Zhukov are written on the last page, but there are no signatures. The document contains numerous additions, corrections and amendments by the hand of Vasilevsky himself and the 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Nikolai Vatutin. Almost all edits are made with a simple one, and a few with a red pencil. A total of 55 sheets contain at least 113 corrections and edits. Unfortunately, this important source was not kept in the archive very carefully. When declassifying and moving the file, archivists and untrained users unceremoniously left notes on the document with a pen and pencil. Some of the pencil marks have been erased, the ink is smeared in a number of places.

Vatutin’s pencil editing, which causes so much controversy. CA MO RF

This circumstance is of fundamental importance, since the back of sheet 27 contains pencil marks, which are cited in marginal literature to justify the supposedly «aggressive intentions of the Kremlin.» This is the phrase «Offensive start», then the numbers 12 and 6 and at the bottom, apparently, the unfinished word «on». Some authors interpret the numbers 12 and 6 as June 12 and conclude that the Kremlin decided to “attack Germany” as early as June 1941 years old. A close examination of the document shows that there is no point between 12 and 6. The dot after the 6 is actually a paper texture, not penciled in. There is also no year. When zoomed in, it is noticeable that the numbers and the word «offensive» are written in different pencils. But even if we assume that Vatutin’s pencil broke and he put down the numbers to others, then the interpretation of «June 12, 1941» is completely unrelated to the meaning of the text and to all other marks. It is also not clear at what time the corrections were made.

The vocabulary of the document (“strong defense”, “stubborn defense”, “to prevent the enemy from breaking through”, etc.) indicates that Vasilevsky and Vatutin considered the option of an offensive by the South-Western Front exclusively in the conditions of a war that had already begun. But there was no clarity with the dates, terms of mobilization and the number of troops. Not surprisingly, the «refined plan» was never adopted. Before us is a draft version, well illustrating the skilled work of the senior officers of the General Staff of the Red Army. Was this plan discussed with Stalin? So far, no supporting information has been found in the archives. There is also no evidence that Timoshenko and Zhukov worked on the text. Nevertheless, it is easy to assume that they got to know him and if it was necessary to discuss the issue in the Kremlin, Vatutin would definitely be called there. However, Zhukov’s first deputy in March and April 1941 years was not with Stalin even once.

The ideas of the «refined plan» of March 11 were used almost verbatim in the directives sent to the military districts. For example, in the April order of the People’s Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff to the commander of the ZapOVO troops, Colonel-General Dmitry Pavlov, on the development of a plan for the operational deployment of the district2. And yet, the main attention in the literature and on the Internet is drawn to another document — «Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies.» It is he who causes the greatest controversy, he is most often referred to, but few people have seen the original, the quality of which is also a lot of claims.

So, we have before us, as with the plan of March 11, a handwritten text by Vasilevsky with corrections and editing by Vatutin. There is no exact date. Only the month is indicated — May. The «Considerations» are dated «not earlier than May 15» in terms of internal content, since the text mentions the location of the German troops «as of 15.5.41.» In fact, the document complements the note dated March 11. This is also a working, draft version with numerous corrections. There are at least 68 of them in the text by 15 sheets.

Document of mid-May 1941, known as «Considerations on the plan for the deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies.» CA MO RF

By mid-May 1941, the concentration of German troops near the Soviet borders assumed a threatening character. There was literally a wave of reports about the imminent start of the war to Moscow. Under these conditions, the General Staff came to the conclusion that Germany «could warn us in deployment and deliver a surprise strike. » Thus was born the idea of ​​a «preemptive strike» by the Red Army, which Stalin was asked to consider. The fundamental idea has not changed — the main blow is still delivered by the forces of the Southwestern Front, and the auxiliary one is the left wing of the Western Front. In other areas, the troops are actively defending.

«Considerations» leave room for ambiguity, from which only Stalin could get rid of. Preemption or «delivering a sudden strike against the enemy both from the air and on the ground» — in what time frame and at what specific moment? According to the then prevailing ideas (they dominated the headquarters of all the armies of the world), first mobilization is carried out, then the concentration and deployment of troops. Judging by previous Soviet plans and directives, the deployment is carried out already in war conditions. While the armies are mobilizing and deploying in battle formations, the covering troops are fighting the enemy on the border, preventing breakthroughs. The Soviet General Staff believed that the Germans needed 10 to 15 days to deploy. It is quite possible that staff members assumed that a declaration of war would follow from Germany. This version was intensively disseminated by the Germans themselves. In this case, the advance and covert concentration of the forces of the Red Army would allow us to gain time and deliver a powerful preemptive strike against the enemy armies that were not yet deployed in the first days of the war. This approach seems quite reasonable.

Let’s pay attention to Vatutin’s important insert in the same document: «… speed up the construction and armament of fortified areas, begin the construction of fortified areas in 1942 on the border with Hungary.» If you prepare troops to go on the offensive, then first you need to build fortified areas that cannot be built in two or three months, in which case the issue of a “preemptive strike” turns into a topic of an indefinitely distant future. Maybe the “considerations” were not about 1941 at all, but about 1942 years? This cannot be denied, since the text contains a request to oblige the People’s Commissariat of Railways (NKPS) to fully implement the 1941 plan for the construction of railways. It is clear that first the implementation of the plan, and then the fighting.

Photo: Commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army N.F. Vatutin leaves the command post. Source: State Archive of the Kursk Region

To what extent did the May «plan of planned military operations in the event of a war with Germany» correspond to the realities of the time, and was it generally feasible? All proposals to “not give the initiative to action to the German command”, “preempt the enemy in deployment”, attack the German army at the most convenient moment, until it organized the front and established the interaction of military branches, corresponded to the requirements of military theory.

This is exactly what the Nazis achieved. Most historians believe that Hitler chose the most convenient moment for the attack, greatly disorienting the Soviet leadership. The authors of the «considerations» definitely overestimated the capabilities of the Red Army and underestimated the strength of the Wehrmacht. A preemptive strike against enemy troops mobilized and ready to strike would hardly have brought the expected results. «To defeat the German army» in such a short time was completely unrealistic. At the same time, the timely bringing of the troops to combat readiness would help to prevent large human and material losses.

Again, we do not have any archival data that the May «considerations» were discussed with Stalin. An unsigned draft with so many corrections and strikethroughs could not be sent and approved by senior management. However, it can be assumed that the ideas of the plan were reported to Stalin and Molotov on May 19, when he received Vatutin, Zhukov and Timoshenko in the Kremlin. Most likely, Vatutin reported. He was in the office from 20:10 to 21:05. These were materials of the highest level of secrecy, and they could only be discussed in the presence of the persons mentioned. The next time Vatutin will appear in the Kremlin along with his leadership on May 24th. On this day, a large meeting was held, which was attended by 22 people.

Stalin’s falsified «speech» at this meeting is being circulated in pseudo-scientific literature and on the net. In reality, no records exist. The agenda is unknown to us. But definitely the topic of a «preemptive» strike could hardly be touched upon by the leader and his subordinates in such a wide composition. True, for 40 minutes the “five” of the initiates (Stalin, Molotov, Vatutin, Zhukov and Timoshenko) sat alone. The next time in a narrow format (without Molotov) they will meet on June 3 (1 hour 30 minutes), June 6 (2 hours 5 minutes) and 9June (1 hour). The last time before the war, Vatutin will visit Stalin on June 17 and stay with him for only 30 minutes (from 22:00 to 22:30), but without Zhukov and Timoshenko.

Photo: Mobilization. Columns of fighters are moving to the front. June 23, 1941. Photographer: Anatoly Garanin. Source: RIAN archive / Wikimedia Commons

In near-scientific literature and on amateur sites on the Internet, the idea is that the Soviet leadership did not have to approve specific plans, since the military allegedly “guided” these “ideas” anyway and put them into practice. At the same time, many authors mindlessly confuse the concepts — «aggression», «attack», «offensive» — ​​and apply them to the Kremlin’s policy towards Nazi Germany on the eve of the war. The origins of such right-wing interpretations must be sought in the propaganda of the Nazis themselves and in the subsequent confrontation with the West during the Cold War. The Nazis made tremendous efforts to present their aggression as a «defensive preemptive action» against the insidious plans of the «Judeo-Bolsheviks», who concentrated large forces on the borders of the Reich. In fact, this is exactly what the Berlin strategists needed. It was important to involve the main forces of the «Russians» in the border battles and defeat them. The justifying idea of ​​»anticipation» was intended for external and internal consumption. It is noteworthy that all preparations for Operation Barbarossa, including plans for the destruction of people, were carried out independently of any actions of the Soviet government.

One of Stalin’s favorite expressions is «we are not naive simpletons.» He wasn’t like that. The General Secretary tried to think rationally and pragmatically. Hitler’s recklessness, his adventurism and irrepressible desire to destroy the USSR, and with it Bolshevism, did not fit into the pragmatic reasoning of the Soviet leader. He tried with all his might to avoid an imminent war, fearing to provoke it with careless actions. Therefore, it is unlikely that he would be able to authorize a preemptive strike against the German armed forces. At a time when it was necessary to take urgent measures as soon as possible, Stalin, like Molotov, believed that «a big game is going on.» In fact, they found themselves in an atmosphere of uncertainty, ignorance, artificially created by the Nazis, and were lost in conjectures about the future. The delay and belated decisions of the supreme power turned into a catastrophe for the country, for which millions of human lives had to be paid.

Author: Sergey Kudryashov, Candidate of Historical Sciences, IRI RAS

Source: Vorontsovo Pole Bulletin No. 2, 2022 (Russian Historical Society)

Feedback

What is your name?

E-mail

Select a topicLeave a reviewSign up for a siteRegistration of sitesInternational sitesTechnical problems

Your message

Invasion of militants in Dagestan. Battles in the Novolaksky district

Documents / On the 20th anniversary of the defeat of international terrorists…

Invasion of militants into Dagestan. Fighting in the Novolaksky district

The second Chechen campaign began with an attack by militants led by Basayev and Khattab on Dagestan. Initially, detachments of Chechen fighters entered the territory of the Botlikh region. Active fighting in this area continued from 7 to 23 August 1999. During these battles, detachments of militants were forced into the territory of Chechnya. From 29August to September 13, Russian troops carried out an operation to capture and destroy the Wahhabi enclave that had formed in the so-called Kadar zone. On September 5, 1999, the detachments of Basayev and Khattab entered Dagestan for the second time, this time a blow was struck on the Novolaksky district of the republic. The blow was supposed to divert the forces of the Russian army and police from the rebellious villages of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi in the Kadar zone.

The operation, which the militants called «Imam Gamzat-bek», began on September 5 and lasted until September 14. During this time, government troops were able to fully restore control over the Kadar zone, in the military sense, the operation of Bassaev and Khattab lost all meaning. They were unable to provide significant assistance to the Wahhabis in Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi, and the vast majority of the population of Dagestan did not support the militants, and were ready to defend their republic with weapons in their hands. On September 14, government troops regained control over the village of Novolakskoe, and on September 15, 19In 1999, the then Minister of Defense of Russia, Igor Sergeyev, reported to Putin that the entire territory of Dagestan was completely liberated from Chechen gangs. Fight for TV tower

By the beginning of September 1999, the militants were forced out of the territory of the Botlikh region. The only villages supporting the bandits, Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi, which were also strongholds of the Wahhabis from among the local population, were surrounded by the federals. The outcome of the battles in this direction was obvious. However, the leadership of the militants decided to launch a surprise strike in the Novolaksky district of Dagestan, which had not yet been involved in hostilities. When planning this operation, Basayev and Khattab counted on the fact that the main forces of the Russian troops would be involved in hostilities on the territory of the Kadar zone. They counted on the speed of action and surprise, at the first stage it bore fruit. Detachments of militants numbering up to two thousand people, again crossing the border with Dagestan, were able to occupy the border villages of Tukhchar, Gamiyakh (Khasavyurt district), as well as Chapaevo and Akhar (Novolaksky district) and the district center Novolakskoye itself. It was possible to stop the breakthrough of the militants only 5 kilometers southwest of Khasavyurt, which was the second largest city in Dagestan. With this blow, the enemy not only tried to pull off part of the Russian troops from the Kadar zone, but also still counted on destabilizing the situation in the republic itself. These plans of the militants failed, while even in the initial phase they faced certain difficulties.

Unexpectedly stubborn was the battle for the dominant height of the TV tower near the village of Novolakskoye. From this height, not only the district center was clearly visible, but also most of the territory of the districts and the main roads. For this reason, on the morning of September 5, 1999, the militants sent several dozen of their fighters to the height. However, it was not possible to immediately take the height, although it was defended by only 6 people — 5 Dagestan policemen of the Novolaksky District Department of Internal Affairs, led by Lieutenant Khalid Murachuev, and one soldier of internal troops.

The group, which consisted of local policemen, was reinforced by one Russian machine gunner from the Russian Interior Ministry Troops. From the sounds of shooting that was heard from the village, the policemen understood what was happening in Novolakskoye. Lieutenant Murachuev managed to organize all-round defense and distributed the available ammunition. The garrison of the TV Tower successfully repulsed the first attack of the militants with dagger fire at close range. The second and third attacks of militants on the heights also failed. As a result, only 6 fighters kept more than 100 fighters near the height during the day. Enemy attacks followed one another, between attacks the height was processed by militants from mortars. In total, the militants launched 7 attacks, which did not lead to success, filling up the approaches to the height with the dead. However, the forces of the defenders were also running out. During one of the attacks, a policeman was killed; in the next, a machine gunner was wounded. The two policemen who carried him out were surrounded and taken prisoner when they left the height. And at the height, lieutenant Murachuev and junior sergeant Isaev were still resisting, both were also wounded by that time. They were able to last the night. The last report from above was received in the early morning of 6 April 1999 years old: «The cartridges have run out, Mutei is wounded, he delivers grenades, I throw.» In the end, the militants were able to break into the height and committed a brutal massacre over its last seriously wounded defenders. Lieutenant Khalid Murachuev was beheaded by militants.

Captured militants spoke about the details of the feat of the defenders of the height and their death in September 2000, indicating the burial places of the heroes. In that battle, up to 50 members of illegal gangs were killed and wounded. At the same time, the militants lost a day to take the TV tower height, having lost the effect of surprise. The battle at the height had not yet subsided, and units of Russian troops were already deploying around the village of Novolakskoye. For courage and heroism, which were shown in the performance of duty, Lieutenant Khalid Murachuev and Junior Sergeant Mutei Isaev were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation on January 31, 2002.

Destruction of the checkpoint and execution of Russian servicemen in the village of Tukhchar

On September 5, 1999, during the re-invasion of militants into Dagestan, they committed a brutal murder of Russian servicemen in the village of Tukhchar. They filmed this murder on videotape, which later fell into the hands of federal forces, and the tragedy itself became widely known. A gang of Chechen fighters, led by Umar Karpinsky, was advancing on Tukhchar. The road to the village was covered by a checkpoint where Dagestani policemen served. A little higher on the mountain stood an infantry fighting vehicle and 13 soldiers from the 22nd separate special-purpose brigade of the Russian Interior Ministry troops from Kalach-on-Don. Having entered the village of Tukhchar from the rear, the gang members were able to take the village police department and began shelling the height on which the brigade fighters were located. Quite quickly, a shot from a grenade launcher knocked out an infantry fighting vehicle of the internal troops, while the gunner died on the spot, and the driver was shell-shocked. The soldiers who survived the battle fled to the village, trying to hide from the militants. However, on the orders of Karpinsky, members of his gang conducted a search, examining both the village and the surrounding area. In one of the houses, the militants found a shell-shocked BMP driver, and in the basement of another, 5 more Russian servicemen. After a warning shot at the house from a grenade launcher, they had to surrender.

By order of Umar Karpinsky, the prisoners were taken to a clearing next to the checkpoint. Here, the militants executed six prisoners — one senior lieutenant and five conscripts. The militants cut the throats of five Russian servicemen, Karpinsky personally killed one of the victims, another soldier was shot while trying to escape. Later, a video of this terrible crime fell into the hands of the Dagestan operational services. Over time, all participants in this murder were punished. The organizer of the murder and the leader of the militants Umar Edilsultanov (Karpinsky) was destroyed after 5 months during an attempt to break through the militants from Grozny. Another 5 people involved in the murder were sentenced to various prison terms, three of them to life imprisonment.

Fight in Novolaksky

In the very district center of Novolakskoye, more than 60 employees of the local police department, as well as fighters of the Lipetsk OMON stationed in the village, were blocked by militants. The fighters did not lay down their arms and fought with the enemy surrounded for about a day. An armored group from the 22nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade of the Interior Ministry of the Russian Federation was sent to help the village, but it could not break through to the encircled and was stopped by militant fire. According to the version of the commander-in-chief of the internal troops (at that time), General V. Ovchinnikov, he personally coordinated mortar fire on enemy positions in order to provide the surrounded riot police and policemen with the opportunity to break out of the encirclement.

At the same time, another version was presented by the direct participants in those battles, it was published in the magazine «Soldier of Fortune» No. 2 for 2001. That article contained the version of the Lipetsk OMON fighters about the battle for Novolakskoye. According to them, after an unsuccessful attempt to release the encircled with the help of the formed armored group, they were essentially abandoned to their fate. They made the decision to break out of the encirclement on their own, and, according to them, no distracting mortar strike from the federal forces was carried out. According to official data, the fighters of the Lipetsk riot police were able to get out of Novolaksky with minimal losses — 2 killed and 6 wounded. At the same time, the total losses of the Russian side during the battle in Novolaksky officially amounted to 15 people killed and 14 wounded.

On By alexxlab