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1. This is a great game and thats all I can say!

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2. Excellent sequel to the PG series, I loved the game play and the new units (the maus especially).

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4. Another great Panzer General. Great setting and great stategy. The AI is strong and you can now advance your generals as far as you want with Another great Panzer General. Great setting and great stategy. The AI is strong and you can now advance your generals as far as you want with no penalty— Buy it now—CHEAP.… Expand

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2. Target — Kyiv. Scorched Earth

In the basement of a school in Petrovtsy — Attack of the guards — The front line of formations from the North Sea and from Brandenburg is broken — Tanks with deafening sirens and blinding headlights — Kyiv cannot be saved — The death of the 88th infantry division — The tragedy of the 25th tank division — A failed German strike — Goth is displaced.

The village of Novye Petrivtsi was located on the Lyutezh bridgehead just behind the Soviet front line. The basement of the destroyed school housed the command post of General Vatutin. Only fifty meters away were the advanced command posts of the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 38th Army. Two army commanders, General Rybalko and General Moskalenko, and members of the Military Councils of their fronts worked in close proximity to the troops. Corps and division commanders also set up their headquarters nearby. Perhaps military history does not know of another similar case, so that such a number of senior officers, up to the front commander, gathered in such a small area, near the main defensive line, in the middle of a bridgehead filled to capacity with troops.

This time the gathering of generals on the front line was by no means a mistake — it was part of the plan. Among other things, the troops had to realize the exceptional importance of the forthcoming operation, which required a special effort from everyone: from the army commander to the last shooter. Meetings were held at which political workers, members of the Military Councils, respected communists and soldiers with many awards spoke. An atmosphere of general enthusiasm and confidence in victory was created in every possible way.

90,002 Red Army soldiers who distinguished themselves were solemnly accepted into the ranks of the Communist Party; in October alone, 13,000 people became members and candidate members of the party on the 1st Ukrainian Front. Vows were publicly given that people would not spare their lives for victory and that Kyiv would be taken by the twenty-sixth anniversary of the October Revolution. The words of Sergeant Valentin Komissarov were widely publicized: «I will fight as long as blood flows in my veins, as long as my eyes can see and my hands can hold weapons.»

November 1, in the basement of the school, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, in the presence of Vatutin, presented the general plan of the operation to the members of the Military Councils. “By all means, Kyiv must be liberated for the holiday,” he announced.

By all means.

Vatutin did not stand up for the price.

At dawn on November 3, two thousand guns and five hundred rocket launchers opened fire on German positions in Lutezh. For forty minutes the shells tore through the morning mist. As soon as the fog began to lift, planes of the Soviet 2nd Air Army appeared and began bombing the German front. After that, the rifle regiment of the 38th Army, supported by Kravchenko’s 5th Guards Tank Corps, went on the offensive. «Hooray!»

The blow fell on three German divisions — the 88th, 68th and 208th infantry divisions: units from Franconia, Hesse and Brandenburg. The artillery preparation was so massive that in the first few hundred meters the Soviet infantry formations practically met no resistance. Only towards the middle of the day did the German opposition get stronger. Nevertheless, the divisions of General Moskalenko managed to break the German front in a section of more than nine kilometers and penetrate the enemy’s defensive zone at a distance of six to nine kilometers.

Colonel-General Goth threw his Hamburg 20th motorized infantry division under the command of General Jauer, as well as parts of the Brandenburg 8th Panzer Division against the Soviet formations that had broken through. In vain. It was impossible to stop the offensive impulse of six rifle divisions and one tank corps.

When the soldiers from Hamburg arrived at the line assigned to them, hand-to-hand combat was already going on there. The Russians got there before them. The grenadier regiments defended themselves desperately and mercilessly. They made counterattacks, evaded oncoming blows, and again went on the attack. The shock groups of the Thuringian 7th Panzer Division fought with them. They even managed to win back some territory.

At this moment, Vatutin began the second stage of his offensive. On the evening of November 4, he moved the tank brigades of General Rybalko’s 3rd Guards Tank Army into battle. They entered the gap torn by the 38th Army, bypassed their infantry and continued to move.

Night has fallen. And something began that the Germans, who had regrouped on the defensive during this time, had never experienced before. It became daylight on the battlefield, and the air was filled with infernal sounds: Rybalko’s tanks were advancing on the German positions with headlights on and sirens on, non-stop firing from cannons. Infantrymen of two rifle divisions, the 167th and 136th, sat on the armor of the tanks. With such a steam roller, they drove deep into the German front. Rybalko hoped that the blinding headlights would cause panic. He also remembered the effect of the «Jericho remedy» used by the German «Stukas» against the Soviet infantrymen: the sirens, howling when the «Stukkas» dived, invariably brought the Russian infantry into a state close to panic. Rybalko hoped to achieve a similar result with his piercing, blinding armored armada. And he succeeded in this in many areas of the weakened front of the 13th and 7th corps.

More effective, of course, was the fire of numerous T-34 brigades. Despite counterattacks by their Panzer Group, General von Manteuffel’s 7th Panzer Division was unable to prevent the Russians from crossing the Irpen, eight kilometers west of Kyiv, and moving along the Zhytomyr road towards Fastov, the most important railway junction southwest of Kyiv. A successfully launched counterattack by the main body of the 7th Panzer Division and the regiments of the 20th Motorized Infantry Division was repulsed by blows from both flanks. Fighters from Thuringia and Franconia were forced to retreat. 9The 0th Grenadier Regiment from Bergedorf was pushed back to the northern part of the city; On November 5, after dark, the regiment under the command of Captain Otto made its way out of the city, taking with them all their wounded.

The 88th Infantry Division retreated to the western region of Kyiv. The division commander, Major General Roth, tried to restore order in his units, but was wounded in battle with the advanced units of the Russian infantry.

At the command post of the 4th Panzer Army, Colonel-General Hoth, one glance at the map of the situation gave an idea of ​​the intentions of the Russians. The tank army of General Rybalko aimed around Kyiv at the major strategic and auxiliary communications of the Manstein Army Group. The 38th army of General Moskalenko, on the contrary, advanced directly on the Ukrainian capital.

Light rain made the day cool and gray over the battlefield near Kyiv. The weather was grey, but the strategic position of Colonel-General Hoth was black. Again, as in all recent months, the Germans did not have sufficient reserves. Hitler continued to keep several free tank divisions in the lower reaches of the Dnieper, because he did not want to lose the Nikopol region with its deposits of manganese ore in any case. The Fuhrer was also worried about approaches to the Crimea.

For this reason, the Thuringian-Hessian 1st Panzer Division was transferred from Greece to the Kirovograd region at the end of October. This replenished and rested division was supposed to counterattack in the area north of Krivoy Rog, but was still busy changing from tropical uniforms to the necessary winter ones. Another major reserve, the 17th Army, Hitler kept in the Crimea, because he did not want this access to Romanian oil to fall into the hands of the Russians. All Manstein’s attempts to get any formations of the 17th Army for the battle for the Dnieper ran into a categorical refusal of the Fuhrer. He gave political and economic considerations. «The evacuation of the Crimea,» objected Hitler, «will make an unfavorable impression on the neighboring Turks, Romanians and Bulgarians.» The same old dilemma that constantly ended in conflicts between Manstein and Hitler: to strengthen the northern wing of Manstein’s army group to forestall the strategic encirclement that threatened it, or to give priority to political interests? There was not enough power to solve both problems. Hitler recognized the dilemma. “But,” he reprimanded Manstein, “this is a risk that you have to take, and I am ready to take responsibility. ”

Colonel-General Gott was sitting in his command post near Makarovo, on the Kyiv-Zhitomir highway, leaning over his maps. The chief of staff, Major General Fangor, reported: “Kyiv can no longer be saved. The 7th Panzer Division, the 20th Motorized Division and the strike group of the SS Panzer Division «Reich» were forced out of the city. Inside Kyiv, the 88th Infantry Division can no longer contain the unfavorable developments. Now it is more important to stop the dangerous offensive in time, which mobile Soviet formations are aiming at our rear communications in the Fastov-Berdichev-Zhitomir region. If we lose the marshalling yards of Fastov and Kazatin, a road vital to the entire army group will be at risk.

Goth nodded. The field phone rang. It was the 7th Corps, they asked for help. But what could Goth give? Events developed inexorably. The Soviet 38th Army stormed Kyiv. The bulk of the German 88th Infantry Division perished in the burning city. Only its remnants without heavy weapons and military equipment made their way to the south and west.

On the night of November 6, as the dawn of the anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution dawned, the forward units of General Kravchenko’s 5th Guards Tank Corps rumbled along Khreshchatyk, the central street of Kyiv. Infantrymen with machine guns from the 4th separate reconnaissance company entered the ruins of the building of the regional committee of the Communist Party and raised a red banner there. Three days after the start of the offensive, the Ukrainian capital was again in the hands of the Russians.

Hardly anything functioned normally in the German troops in the area north of Kyiv: tank units were mostly sent into battle, regardless of their condition; the main forces of the 19th Panzer Division were completely transferred to Bukrin. The only thing that worked perfectly is the German railway workers.

Map 39. Bypassing Kyiv, Rybalko’s tank army aimed at the supply lines of Manstein’s army group. A critical situation was also created at the Zaporozhye bridgehead. On the night of October 14-15, General Heinrici was forced to give the order to blow up the power plant and the dam.

Not a single locomotive was left in Kyiv. The railway workers of the Reich division and the field railway sabotage and airborne detachment sent a total of 24,911 wagons loaded with trophy property.

Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev was the hero of the day. The first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine entered Kyiv in a general’s uniform, he was honored as a liberator. His big day has come.

General Rybalko, the true winner, didn’t care about praise. With the brigades of his 3rd Guards Tank Army, he raced past the city in the direction to the south. Rebuffed there by the 10th Motorized Infantry Division, he quickly regrouped and moved into the wide gaps in the front of the 7th Corps southwest of Kyiv. He passed the sector of the Irpen River and cut the rear communications of the German troops, who were still defending near Kyiv. He blocked the high roads leading to Kyiv, and on November 7 he took Fastov, a transport center fifty kilometers southwest of Kyiv, the city through which all the supply lines of the northern flank of Manstein’s army group passed. Rybalko’s tank forces swept away two rifle battalions of local defense, a combined battalion formed from military personnel on leave, and several anti-aircraft crews belonging to combat and searchlight units that were ordered to defend the city. Several men from the headquarters of the 7th Panzer Division, thrown into place on November 5, could not prevent the catastrophe and were forced to fight their way back to the division on foot.

This time events developed too rapidly even for the German railroad workers who moved trains from Kyiv to Fastiv. There, on the sidings of the huge sorting yards, all the rolling stock, including forty-five steam locomotives, stood. Nothing could be salvaged—and rolling stock is more valuable in the East than anywhere else. It was a disaster, but even worse was the fact that Rybalko was already in the rear of Army Group South.

When the news of the fall of Fastov reached Manstein, he immediately flew to Rastenburg to meet with Hitler to convince him to transfer three tank divisions intended for defensive battles on the Lower Dnieper to a counterattack in the Fastov area.

But Hitler refused again. His fear of losing mineral deposits and the Crimea overcame concern about the fate of Manstein’s northern wing. Manstein was in despair. “If things go badly, my Fuhrer, the entire Army Group South will be doomed,” he warned Hitler.

This warning provoked a small concession—the Führer authorized the use of two panzer divisions (the 1st Panzer Division and the SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler) not in the lower reaches of the Dnieper, but in Kyiv. However, both formations were still on the way, and it was impossible to count on their prompt delivery.

Thus, the only question that turned out to be fatal, the use of the 25th Panzer Division, was not discussed. It was supposed to be introduced into the battle in Fastov directly from the trains by which they were transferred from France.

The

Division was formed only in the summer, reinforced with the replenished 9th Tank Regiment, delivered from Norway to France, and there it gained its first combat experience. Now she was being taken to the 4th Panzer Army. The division was commanded by General von Schell, an experienced soldier. But does the commander determine everything? The division did not unite, it had never fought as a division and, moreover, had absolutely no idea what the Eastern Front was. However, Colonel-General Hoth was not given a choice. Despite all the fears, he was forced to throw her into battle at Fastov in the hope of retaining the transport center.

Hoth’s decision was also based on yet another consideration. General von Schell received from Guderian not only the 9th tank regiment (90 T-IV tanks), but also the full 509th battalion of heavy tanks — 45 Tigers. 135 combat-ready tanks gave real hope. Rybalko, according to rough estimates, had about the same number — and he had T-34s.

Again, however, we are confronted with the fact that the outcome of battles and entire campaigns is often determined by errors, confusion, and wrong orders. The Tigers battalion and the main part of the tank regiment of the 25th Panzer Division, which could change the fate of Fastov, did not get there at all. When the motorized infantry units of the division unloaded in Berdichev to move to Fastov, there were no tank units there. The day before, they were sent by rail to the southeast, and at that moment they were approaching the Kirovograd station, at 195 kilometers from Berdichev. Kirovograd, of course, was the original destination of the division, the army simply did not reorient the tank units in time.

As a result, assault gun crews, artillerymen and sappers found themselves in front of Rybalko’s tank brigades without tanks. The 146th motorized infantry regiment south of Fastov almost immediately ran into large groups of T-34s from the 55th Guards Tank Brigade. Russian patrols noticed the German columns in time, and the brigade commander calmly prepared a surprise attack. 9th company of Germans was shot. The 6th company went straight to hell: the company commander, almost the entire junior command staff and 160 soldiers died under fire from the T-34. Panic broke out, engulfing the entire 2nd Battalion.

Despite these heavy losses, General von Schell personally led his battalions forward again, but their morale had already dried up. When the advance units of the 9th Panzer Regiment finally arrived from Kirovograd two days later, the heavily depleted battalions launched a new attack on Fastov under the command of their division commander and pushed the Russians back. They had already made their way straight to the outskirts of the city, one assault squad even seized the access roads. In a fierce battle, they were again knocked out. But they broke through again. And retreated again. In the end, the counterattack stalled at an altitude of two and a half kilometers from the city. A decisive deep breakthrough into the Russian flank was no longer possible, the Germans suffered too heavy losses. When Corporal Fitschen arrived with a group of stragglers in the 6th company, out of 12 people he found only two soldiers and one non-commissioned officer. The company was reduced to 75 combat-ready people. Up to seventy five. Ten days ago, 240 people boarded a train in France.

Nevertheless, the unfortunate 25th Panzer Division achieved one important result — it stopped the advance of Rybalko to the south and, together with the shock group of the SS Reich division, the 10th motorized infantry division and the newly arrived 198th infantry division, blocked the Soviet breakthrough . This gave Manstein enough time to bring up fresh forces for a massive counterattack.

Stalin’s chance to destroy the German southern flank was again missed. Of course, the Russians made significant headway to the west and captured Zhytomyr with the huge stores of the 4th Panzer Army. But General Mattencloth’s 13th Corps managed for the moment to stop the penetration by the 8th Panzer Division and the 20th Motorized Infantry Division. North 59th corps with the 291st infantry division and the gun crew of the «C» corps prevented a Soviet breakthrough at the junction of army groups near Korosten. The most serious threat to Manstein was over. His 48th Panzer Corps was a powerful force of six panzer and several grenadier divisions; they were now south of the line from Fastov to Zhitomir, ready to flank the westward Russians.

For the first time, Manstein truly wrested a significant fighting force from Hitler. Divisions were brought in from all parts of Europe — from Norway, Greece and Northern Italy. Among them were selected and partially newly armed units with extensive experience in battles on the Eastern Front, such as the 1st SS Panzer Division «Leibstandarte», 1 and 19I Panzer divisions. General Herman Balk, one of the best combat commanders of the Wehrmacht, was appointed commander of the corps. But in order to inflict a decisive defeat on the four Russian armies already concentrated on the Kiev bridgehead plus two separate corps and push them back across the Dnieper, six divisions of the 48th Panzer Corps were not enough.

Guderian understood this. On November 9, he asked Hitler for reinforcements. «Relocate all free divisions of Army Groups South and A, even if the risk is great enough,» he suggested. However, Hitler decided in favor of a counterattack, which he, as usual, undertook with inadequate forces. And I had to pay for the mistake. Truth 59The 1st Army Corps stabilized the situation at Korosten, and the 48th Tank Corps returned the Zhitomir-Radomyshl-Brusilov-Fastov region and, with its successful counterattack, once again demonstrated that the German tank forces, when they are led by experienced commanders, are capable of much in the fifth winter war. The superior enemy was bypassed by a deft maneuver, his offensive was stopped and an entire corps was destroyed. However, the impossible was not achieved — Kyiv remained in the hands of the Russians. The offensive power of the 4th Panzer Army dried up. The Russians held on to the heart of their strategic foothold near Kyiv.

This bridgehead was more than 80 kilometers deep and about 190 kilometers along the front. In such a huge sector, the German front was now pushed back from the Middle Dnieper. The Soviet wedge, reinforced by offensive troops, protruded dangerously to the west,

Colonel-General Goth, a military leader who had proven himself in thousands of battles, became a scapegoat and took responsibility for a situation that had developed solely due to Hitler’s mistakes. He was ordered to transfer command of the 4th Panzer Army to General Raus.

the first Great Victory of the Great War — RBC

Exactly 70 years ago, the counteroffensive near Moscow began — the first successful major operation of the Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War. The battle that debunked the myth of the invincibility of Nazi Germany and marked the beginning of the country’s liberation from occupation.

Photo: soldat1941.narod.ru

However, the battle for the capital did not begin on December 5, but in those autumn days when Adolf Hitler and his generals still expected to achieve a quick victory.

German «Typhoon»: the first attempt to reach the Volga

After the capture of Kyiv, the German troops were given the task of defeating the Soviet troops in the central sector of the front — to take Moscow and reach the Volga in the Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod) region. The operation was given the name «Typhoon».

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This plan was to be carried out by the best German generals at that time, who had numerous awards for victories in Poland and France. Under the leadership of the commander of the army group «Center» General Fedor von Bock were such generals as Georg Reinhardt, Hans von Kluge, Erich Hoepner, and Heinz Guderian.

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At the time the operation began, the Germans were west of Vyazma, south of Bryansk and Orel, but already in the first week of Typhoon, the Nazis advanced tens of kilometers ahead. Orel fell on October 3, Bryansk on October 6, Kaluga on October 13, Kalinin (Tver) on October 14, and on October 16 the Germans were already in Mozhaisk. At the same time, two «boilers» were immediately behind the Nazis: near Bryansk, three Soviet armies were surrounded, and near Vyazma — 37 divisions. H. Guderian recalled in his memoirs that after such a victory he was sure of a further triumph.

However, thanks to the courage, including those of the encircled units, who did not want to surrender and constantly made attempts to break out to their own, the pace of the German offensive slowed down. In addition, with every kilometer towards Moscow, the Nazis faced more and more fierce resistance and even counterattacks. As a result, it was not possible to break through to the capital until the end of October, and then the pace dropped completely due to the onset of mud. By the way, after the war, the Germans created a legend about terrible frosts near Moscow. Some memoirs even spoke of a 50-degree cold. However, in early November, the temperature in the capital was around -5 degrees (including on the day of the Parade), and on the coldest days it reached -20. Biting frosts came at the beginning of December, when the Germans were no longer advancing anywhere, and they only held out for a few days, which is typical for the current December weather in Moscow. Cases of frostbite in the German army are due to the fact that, according to the officers, they simply did not have time to deliver warm uniforms. In addition, they had to spend the night in dugouts dug in the ground, since it was far from always possible to find the surviving houses in the occupied territory — they were burned either by the Germans themselves, knocking out the defenders from there, or by the retreating units.

It was not «General Frost» who stopped the German offensive, but the courage of the soldiers and the courage of the inhabitants of Moscow. Despite the departure to Kuibyshev (Samara) of most members of the government (even Lenin’s body was taken to the Volga), no one wanted to believe in the fall of the city, including Stalin, who remained in the capital. Residents built fortifications, barricades appeared on the streets, the metro turned into a giant bomb shelter, and soldiers fought for every meter. And from the famous Parade on November 7 on Red Square (which has become one of the symbols of perseverance) they went to the front. The exploits of Soviet soldiers near Volokolamsk, Zvenigorod, Kashira, Yakhroma became a legend. The feat of Ivan Panfilov, who fought to the last on the Volokolamskoye highway together with the 316th division, political instructor Vasily Klochkov with his immortal «Russia is great, but there is nowhere to retreat — behind Moscow» are examples of the fearlessness of soldiers in this battle.

Everyone who could hold a weapon went into battle. In Kalinin, when the Nazis approached, rifles were distributed to factory workers: for several hours they repelled the attacks of the Germans breaking through to the bridge across the Volga. In Tula, ammunition was brought to the front line by tram.

Professors of the capital’s higher education institutions, junior students who stood up for the city, fought on the Moscow line of defense. The military art of the capital’s divisions of the people’s militia, which began to form back in July, learned already in battle, and therefore the losses among the militias were huge — some of the divisions were completely destroyed. Among the dead are Professor of the Moscow Conservatory, «piano poet» Abram Dyakov, a close associate of Sergei Korolev, one of the founders of Russian cosmonautics Yuri Kondratyuk.

Women and children built defensive structures, dug anti-tank ditches, prepared trenches and trenches. The Garden and Boulevard Rings were covered with barricades, and the Moscow District Railway was to become a line of defense.

Those who did not hold weapons in their hands tried to contribute to the defense of the city. The artists of the Stanislavsky and Nemirovich-Danchenko Theater held additional performances, the entire collection from which went to the fund for the construction of new tanks. A similar step was taken by the artists of the Bolshoi Theater.

It is important to note that Muscovites did not act on orders from above. Documents of those times show that party propaganda activity at the end of 1941. significantly weakened, and in some places was disorganized. At the same time, the authorities managed to maintain order in the city and prevent German agents from organizing riots and sabotage.

Residents of the capital felt that a decisive moment had come for the city. In the event of a breakthrough by the enemy, an unenviable fate awaited Moscow — explosions and arson of all important objects, including most of the center, prepared by their own people, or flooding (Hitler insisted on this controversial plan from a technical point of view at one time). According to another version, the Nazis were going to keep Moscow as the administrative center of the «Reich Commissariat Muscovy» under their control with the headquarters of the occupying forces, the main airfield (without the indigenous population evicted from the city).

By the beginning of December, the Germans managed to break through to Naro-Fominsk, reach Zvenigorod, and in the north-western direction approach Krasnaya Polyana (now the Lobny microdistrict, 32 km from the Kremlin). It is known that German scouts and motorcyclists even got to the area of ​​​​the current Sokol metro station, but the Nazis were not destined to be photographed against the backdrop of the Kremlin. Zagorsk (Sergiev Posad), Noginsk, Kolomna remained unrealistic goals for the Germans. As early as December 4, they were in charge of those lands where the fashionable villages of the near Moscow region now stand, planning new attacks, and on December 5 they were no longer up to it.

A typhoon swept away by a hurricane

The counteroffensive near Moscow is recognized by almost all historians as one of the brightest events of World War II. Specialists admire the fact how timely it was carried out. Indeed, by December 5, the Germans had certain problems. The losses in manpower were quite large, the surviving soldiers were pretty exhausted by constant battles with an uncompromising enemy, and units that had previously led a free lifestyle in occupied France and Belgium had to be transferred to Moscow. In addition, partisans became more active in the rear, serious interruptions began in the supply of fuel and ammunition. For the first time, the Germans began to experience problems with food.

Perhaps later the Germans would be able to resolve these issues, and therefore it was important not to give them time to regroup. For this, it was decided to bring into battle the reserve armies, which were held east of Moscow. Additional units from Siberia were also transferred to the west.

The plan developed by the Soviet command did not provide for a counterattack on one specific flank, but for an almost simultaneous strike against the stretched German communications on the entire offensive front of Army Group Center. The troops under the overall command of Generals Ivan Konev and Georgy Zhukov, as well as Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, were supposed to make the Germans waver.

Already the first results of the counteroffensive fully justified all expectations. The first blow near Kalinin, where the 31st and 29th armies fought, shocked the Germans. “Out of the morning mist, columns of regiments in sheepskin coats and tanks fell out of nowhere,” recalls a German officer who survived then. The enemy was completely unprepared for this. Communication between neighboring units was broken, the defense was broken, and they had to flee. A similar situation arose in the area of ​​Krasnaya Polyana and Dmitrov, as well as to the east of Tula.

The Germans failed to repel the attack of the Soviet troops in any of the sectors, and after a few days they randomly retreated to the west. On December 7, the 16th Army of Konstantin Rokossovsky liberated Istra, on December 15, the 20th Army of Andrei Vlasov liberated Klin, on the 16th — Kalinin, on December 20, units of General Leonid Govorov took Volokolamsk, on December 26, the 33rd Army of General Efremov liberated Naro-Fominsk. To the south, the Soviet troops passed like a hurricane from Mikhailov and Yelets to Kaluga and Belev, unblocking Tula and forcing H. Guderian to hastily retreat.

Together with the Germans fled the «authorities» created by them, recruited from among the traitors. For example, from Rzhev, which was approached by Soviet troops, the burgomaster with his deputy, as well as the chief of police, fled, taking with them the entire city treasury. Later they were found in Minsk and shot.

By the beginning of January, the modern Moscow, Ryazan, Tula and Lipetsk regions, most of the Kaluga and Kalinin regions, as well as the eastern regions of the Smolensk region, were completely cleared of Germans. For the first time since the beginning of World War II, the Germans had to give up such a large territory, admitting their defeat.

In order to stop the stampede, Hitler, who was furious, took drastic measures. An order was issued that was somewhat reminiscent of Stalin’s «Not a step back. » Soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht were forbidden to retreat under pain of being shot, and if necessary, they were required to fight to the last. In addition, Hitler ordered the use of scorched earth tactics, destroying settlements in front of the advancing Soviet troops. In fact, cities that were not completely destroyed during the offensive of the German army were doomed to destruction. The Germans did not always have time to fulfill this plan, but the first investigative acts on the atrocities of the invaders were drawn up even then.

In addition, a number of personnel changes followed in the German command. The commander of the ground forces, Walter von Brauchitsch, lost his post and was transferred to the reserve (he died in a hospital for prisoners of war in 1948), F. von Bock was removed (in 1942 he was transferred to the reserve, and in May 1945 he was killed during a British air raid), E. Gepner was fired for cowardice (shot in 1944 for participating in an anti-Nazi conspiracy), sent to the reserve by H. Guderian (later he would work on the theory of armored forces, and after the war he would write memoirs).

The end of the battle: a triumph that could not be developed

In Soviet historiography, the end of the Battle of Moscow was dated to the beginning of the spring of 1942, but the details were omitted. In fact, the Soviet command, at the request of I. Stalin, tried to develop an offensive. However, the fatigue of the units making their way forward, the German reinforcements that arrived from the West, as well as the above-mentioned orders of the Berlin leaders again led to heavy losses among the Soviet soldiers.

The Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation, during which the command expected to defeat the «Center» grouping and create conditions for the liberation of Smolensk, ended in failure. The offensive bogged down, and thousands of soldiers and officers were surrounded in the south of the Smolensk region. The front line stabilized at the level of Rzhev — Sychevka — Vyazma — Ugra. The Battle of Rzhev will begin, which will become one of the most tragic pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War.

The fate of several generals at once, who showed themselves excellently in the Battle of Moscow, was tragic.

General Lev Dovator, who commanded the 2nd Guards Corps advancing near Zvenigorod, was killed on December 21 near Ruza. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

General Mikhail Efremov, whose 33rd Army liberated Naro-Fominsk and Borovsk, in April 1942. was surrounded along with soldiers near Vyazma. Not wanting to surrender, he shot himself. It is known that the Germans who found his body buried the general with military honors, paying tribute to his courage.

Finally, General Andrei Vlasov, who commanded the 20th Army during the Klinsko-Solnechnogorsk operation, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and even managed to publish an article on the implementation of Stalin’s plan (allegedly the leader personally developed the operation plan), in 1942. will be taken prisoner near Leningrad, will lead the so-called Russian Liberation Army (ROA) and will be hanged in 1946. for treason.

Results of the battle

The battle near Moscow did not lead to the defeat of the German troops. The Nazis still had enough strength to in the summer of 1942g. inflict a heavy defeat on the Red Army near Kharkov, occupy the Kuban, reach the Volga and the North Caucasus. However, in fact, for the first time, the German war machine was forced to admit defeat. The Blitzkrieg was thwarted, the war dragged on, which was absolutely not beneficial to the Germans, whose resources were inferior to the Soviet ones.

The Battle of Moscow also had important political implications. Japan, after the failure of the Germans, refrained from opening a «second front» in the Soviet Far East, while Great Britain and the United States, on the contrary, believed that the USSR might not lose this war. Cooperation between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition is noticeably intensifying, and at the same time the USSR receives military materials, which Moscow lacked in the first months.